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Response
Colin Hottman
Within the economic development discourse, few ideas have been as 
contested as the “Washington Consensus.” It is widely considered to 
be both synonymous with neo-liberalism and hegemonic within the 
discourse. By placing the Washington Consensus within a historical 
context, Professor Kanbur shows that it emerged as a response to the 
statist development consensus of the 1950s–1970s. Several important 
lessons can be drawn from this circumstance. First, each distinct period 
of development policy, both the early state-directed policies and later 
the Washington Consensus, were promoted by economists and interna-
tional financial institutions at the time. Second, the economic develop-
ment discourse is event driven. Third, the new economic development 
consensus differs fundamentally from previous prescriptions since it is 
not “one size fits all.” Each of these lessons will be covered in Section 
II of this essay.
While it does provide significant insight into the origins and mean-
ings of the Washington Consensus, Professor Kanbur’s account of the 
evolution of the economic development discourse is not without its 
shortcomings. His categorization of development policies within a 
Left-Right policy space leads him to emphasize the political overtones 
of the events driving the economic policy discourse, rather than dis-
cuss the progression of economic development theory. Additionally, 
by focusing on the political content of the economic development dis-
course, rather than on the particular spaces from which it originates, 
Kanbur’s account does not tell us anything about the public and pri-
vate spaces within and around the institutions of global economic gov-
ernance from which the discourse originates. These limitations will be 
covered in Section III of my article.
Section IV discusses a perspective on development that raises some 
interesting questions for Dr. Kanbur and the new economic develop-
ment consensus. I articulate the view that development is about the 
advancement of human freedom and that all countries face unique 
institutional constraints. I use these two concepts to highlight the 
importance of two neglected issues in development policy: immigra-
tion and state failure. Section V concludes the essay.
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*****
Emerging after the birth of macroeconomics and the industrialization 
of the Soviet Union, the early postwar development approach naturally 
favored state intervention as the means to spur development in the 
Third World. Many government advisors in Third World nations were 
trained in the First World, and it was with the strong support of First 
World economists and global institutions (such as the World Bank) 
that Third World countries engaged in state-directed industrialization. 
The first lesson to learn is that throughout each phase of development 
policy, during both the early state-directed policies and later the Wash-
ington Consensus, the policies implemented were those championed 
by prominent economists and international financial institutions. This 
is important to keep in mind, especially given Kanbur’s account of 
why the fashionable development polices have changed over time.
Kanbur’s explanation is that the economic development discourse is 
event driven. This is the second important lesson to learn. Starting in 
the 1970s, and intensifying in the 1980s, events like the OPEC oil shocks 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union cast doubt upon the efficacy of 
government planning in both the First and the Third World. Add to 
this the emergence of the East Asian “tigers,” who offered a model of 
export-oriented development, and it is easy to understand how doubt 
could start to plague the early statist development consensus. The 
responsiveness of the economic development discourse to worldwide 
events highlights the fact that “the Theory of Economics…is a method 
rather than a doctrine…a technique of thinking, rather than a body of 
settled conclusions.”1 This is important to bear in mind, especially for 
those critics of the Washington Consensus who conflate the economics 
discipline with market fundamentalism.
The third useful lesson is that the new “Washington Confusion”2 
differs fundamentally from previous development prescriptions. Both 
the statist development consensus of the 1950s–1970s and the Wash-
ington Consensus of the 1980s–1990s were “one size fits all.”3 The 
new economic development consensus, as characterized by Kanbur, 
is not a generic formula. It stresses the importance of country-specific 
characteristics and of experimenting with growth strategies. While 
he acknowledges that some critics consider the new consensus to be 
unfocused, Kanbur prefers to emphasize the recent inclusion of distri-
butional concerns and the benefits of a broader perspective. The key 
point is that this new consensus is formed around the idea that there 
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is no one set of economic policies that constitute universally sufficient 
conditions for economic development.
*****
Professor Kanbur’s account of the evolution of the economic develop-
ment discourse is not flawless. His placement of development policies 
on a political spectrum leads him to focus on the political nature of 
the events driving the economic policy discourse, at the cost of con-
sidering the parallel development of economic theory. For example, 
while the change from the early statist development consensus to the 
Washington Consensus was indeed partly driven by specific historical 
events, it was also a result of the shift in development economics from 
early models based mainly on savings to additional insights, such as 
the importance of institutions. Of course, the development of economic 
theory is itself an endogenous, dialectical process, but it is also a lens 
through which historical events are interpreted. By even weakly asso-
ciating development policies with political ideologies, this sort of clas-
sification makes it easy to forget that the real lesson we have learned 
over the past fifty years is that neither end of the policy spectrum is 
universally correct. Promoting development is not so easy.
By focusing on the changing content of the economic development 
discourse, Kanbur is able to situate the Washington Consensus within 
a particular historical moment. Such an approach ignores important 
questions regarding the public and private spaces from which the dis-
course originates. Do “Ministry of Finance types” still hold a hege-
monic position within these spaces? In what ways does the nature of 
these spaces shape the forms that contestation can take? Have deci-
sion-making processes within the institutions of global economic 
governance changed within the last fifty years? Do such institutions 
approach the implementation of development policy differently now 
than in the past?
These questions have significant implications for the effectiveness 
of development policy that are separate from questions regarding the 
ideological content of said policies. For example, Joseph Stiglitz argues 
that proper sequencing and pacing of reforms is vital to their success.4
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*****
Now I will discuss a view of development that raises some challeng-
ing questions for Kanbur and the new Washington Confusion. First, 
I will explain a simple but powerful model from Djankov and col-
leagues5 that provides insight into the problems with one-size-fits-all 
policy prescriptions and will also be helpful in explaining some of the 
issues highlighted by my human-freedom conception of development. 
In this model, institutions function to control the trade-off between the 
costs of dictatorship and the costs of disorder. The costs of dictatorship 
generally consist of the risk of expropriation of citizens by a predatory 
state, while the costs of disorder consist of the risk of expropriation 
of citizens by private agents. Each country has a specific set of insti-
tutional possibilities, with the set representing a continuum of pos-
sible institutional arrangements ranging from a centralized command 
economy to anarchy. Moving along the continuum involves trading 
off the costs of dictatorship with the costs of disorder. The total costs 
of dictatorship and disorder are functions of what Djankov et al. call 
“civic capital.” This civic capital is a function of the culture’s degree 
of trust in strangers, ethnic homogeneity, the society’s level of human 
capital, the degree of equality, and the country’s physical environment, 
among other factors. Generally speaking, countries with a high degree 
of civic capital have lower costs of dictatorship and disorder. How-
ever, cross-country differences in the composition of civic capital can 
lead to variability in the costs of dictatorship relative to the costs of 
disorder in the various countries. Those institutional arrangements 
within the institutional possibilities set that minimize the total costs 
of dictatorship and disorder are the efficient institutional choice. One 
way to look at the new consensus in economic development policy is 
to notice that, given this model of the effects of institutions, there will 
not be a universally optimal choice of institutional arrangement across 
countries due to differences in each country’s endowment and compo-
sition of civic capital. Thus, when formulating a development strategy, 
it is important to take into account country-specific characteristics and 
initial conditions. Countries face institutional constraints as a result of 
their culture and history. Given such constraints, certain changes, such 
as rapid reforms shrinking the size of the state, may be very costly in 
terms of the costs of disorder. It depends entirely upon the country in 
question and its features.
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Abstracting from particular countries, development has histori-
cally been conceived as a temporal process in which different countries 
experience similar effects. One potential effect, or marker, or even defi-
nition of development is an increase in economic growth. An alterna-
tive definition of development is improvements in social indicators, 
such as child malnutrition. In defining development, “there is liable to 
be a competitive struggle to get one’s own definition accepted. Those 
who struggle, wishing to influence policy, are right to do so. If a defini-
tion gets accepted, it tends to deemphasize considerations not included 
in the definition.”6
I propose that development is about the advancement of human 
freedom. Prominent economists have advocated such an approach to 
evaluating economic development. As Arthur Lewis argued in The 
Theory of Economic Growth, “The advantage of economic growth is not 
that wealth increases but that it increases the range of human choice…
economic growth increases man’s freedom.”7 Peter Bauer wrote that he 
considers “the extension of the range of choice…as the principal objec-
tive and criterion of economic development.”8 However, no develop-
ment economist has written more thoughtfully or convincingly on this 
approach than Amartya Sen. In Development as Freedom, Sen writes 
that, “in this approach, expansion of freedom is viewed as both (1) the 
primary end and (2) the principal means of development.”9 An expansion 
of the freedom of individuals is “the expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of 
persons to lead the kind of lives they value.”10 The concept of capabili-
ties includes “being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation…as 
well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate…enjoying 
political participation and uncensored speech,” the freedom to choose 
commodity baskets and engage in market exchange, and enjoying pro-
tective security from poverty.11
I think that such an individual-level focus is crucial when formulat-
ing development policy. This contrasts with the widely held concep-
tion of development within the economic development discourse, one 
based on economic growth and national economic policy objectives. 
The typical approach, based on measuring development using aggre-
gate national statistics, reifies the nation-state and obscures changes in 
individual capabilities. As Friedrich Hayek noted in his Nobel Memo-
rial Lecture, “while in the physical sciences the investigator will be able 
to measure what, on the basis of a prima facie theory, he thinks impor-
tant, in the social sciences often that is treated as important which 
happens to be accessible to measurement.”12 Furthermore, unlike the 
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physical sciences, the social sciences have to deal with structures of 
organized complexity and, therefore, Hayek argues that we cannot 
“replace the information about the individual elements by statistical 
information.”13 The human-freedom approach to development thus 
may not be practically measurable and might be dismissed by some 
critics as unscientific. Setting aside the premise that development is 
inherently normative, the individual-freedom approach to develop-
ment is valuable because it provides important lessons for policymak-
ers. The individual-freedom conception of development directly leads 
to innovative development policies that challenge the reified nation-
state. Two prominent examples include the issues of immigration and 
state failure.
Despite its position on capital mobility, the Washington Consensus 
was never associated with advocating the free mobility of labor. The 
new Washington Confusion appears to also be silent on the issue as 
well. Within the development-as-human-freedom approach, relaxing 
immigration controls directly constitutes development, since it values 
an individual’s capability to choose where to live. This seems to have 
been lost in the debate on immigration reform in the United States. 
From the perspective of the individual-freedom approach, the United 
States is directly preventing development. Mexican immigrants should 
be allowed access to the U.S. labor market. Additionally, the movement 
of labor out of countries with weak institutions may in fact be the easi-
est way to increase development for their populations.14 It is just not 
clear that every nation-state is capable of producing development.
This leads to the second issue, that of state failure. Within the eco-
nomic development discourse, state failure is treated mostly as some-
thing to be prevented or reversed. This is the result of reifying the 
state. Development is widely considered to be almost impossible 
without some state institutions. The development-as-human-freedom 
approach differs from the conventional approach on the implications 
of state failure.
Consider the case of Somalia, which has been in a condition of anar-
chy since 1991. Using event study methodology comparing human 
development indicators in Somalia for 1985–1990 with those for 2000–
2005, Peter Leeson found that fourteen of the eighteen human develop-
ment indicators have improved in the years since the state collapsed. 
For example, the percentage of one-year-olds fully immunized against 
TB increased from 31% to 50%, while the infant mortality rate per 1,000 
dropped from 152 to 114.89.15 The percentage of the population with 
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access to at least one healthcare facility rose from 28% to 54.8%, while 
the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty fell from 
60% to 43.2%. To the extent that the changes in these human develop-
ment indicators reflect actual improvements in peoples’ capabilities, 
they represent development. In Somalia’s case, Leeson argues that the 
collapse of the predatory Somali state actually led to the increased pro-
vision of private law and order—and with it increased development. 
Powell and colleagues use a comparative institutional approach and 
find that their results agree with Leeson’s conclusions. Somalia’s stan-
dard of living has improved since the state collapsed.16
Using the costs of dictatorship and disorder model discussed pre-
viously, Somalia has specific conditions that define its institutional 
choice. The country went from having some level of government with 
very high costs of dictatorship and low costs of disorder to having no 
government, with the resultant costs of disorder being less than the 
costs of dictatorship that would be incurred at any level of government. 
Now, as conditions in Somalia change, the costs of dictatorship and 
disorder that Somalia faces regarding particular institutional arrange-
ments will change. It may result in the efficient institutional choice 
becoming some form of central government. At this time, however, 
Somalia is unable to obtain relatively cheap government in terms of the 
costs of dictatorship and disorder. Thus, foreign state-building inter-
ventions into Somalia are counterproductive.17 In a new assessment, 
Peter Leeson and Claudia Williamson argue that, “allowing total state 
collapse in the poorest parts of the developing world—those countries 
in which complete government failure and the emergence of anarchy 
is most imminent—may actually be the most promising avenue for 
improving the social welfare of the citizens in these countries.”18
*****
The development policy discourse has changed dramatically in the 
last decades. There are three important lessons to draw from Profes-
sor Kanbur’s account of the changes in the discourse. The first lesson 
is that each distinct wave of development policy, both the early state-
directed policies and the Washington Consensus, were recommended 
by the economists and international financial institutions at the time. 
The second lesson is that the economic development discourse is event 
driven. After the events of the 1990s, the Washington Consensus lost 
its hegemonic position. Related to this, the third lesson is that the new 
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Washington Confusion differs fundamentally from previous develop-
ment prescriptions since it is not a one-size-fits all paradigm.
There are two limitations to Professor Kanbur’s account of the his-
torical evolution of the economic development discourse. First, his 
view of development policies with a political lens puts the focus on the 
political nature of the events framing the economic policy discourse, 
instead of on the advancement of economic theory. Second, by focus-
ing on the political content of the economic development discourse, 
rather than on the particular spaces from which it originates, Kanbur’s 
account does not reveal anything regarding the public and private 
spaces within and around the institutions of global economic gover-
nance from which the discourse originates.
Even though the new economic development consensus is not a one-
size-fits-all development paradigm, it still centers around states as the 
appropriate actors and on national economic growth as the appropri-
ate measure for development. While this new development consensus 
is not intrinsically in conflict with the individual-freedom approach or 
the idea that all countries face unique institutional constraints, conven-
tional development policy generally neglects the issues of immigration 
and state failure. While I am critical of the prevailing view of these two 
issues, I am confident that increases in individual freedom over time 
will lead to improvements in the human condition.
Notes
1. Rostow 1962.
2. See Naim 2000.
3. Jagdish Bhagwati considers this to be a “silly critique” (Bhagwati 2005).
4. Stiglitz 2002.
5. Djankov et al. 2003.
6. Little 1982.
7. Srinivasan 1994.
8. Bauer 1957.
9. Sen 1999.
10. Ibid.
11. Additional capabilities that highlight the advantage of using the development-as-
human-freedom approach include the ability to enjoy the environment and to avoid 
becoming a victim of violence. (Sen 1999).
12. Hayek 1978.
13. Ibid.
14. This is exactly the argument made by Lant Pritchett (2006).
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15. Leeson 2007.
16. Powell et al. 2008. For further evidence of the costs of predatory government and the 
areas of Somalia’s improvement since state collapse, see Nenova 2004, and Nenova and 
Harford 2004.
17. For a discussion of the difficulties of rebuilding failed states through interventions 
with reference to Somalia, see Coyne 2008.
18. Leeson and Williamson 2008.
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